We propose a principled way of defining and measuring contextuality in systems with deterministic inputs and random outputs. We illustrate it on systems with two binary inputs and two binary random outputs, the prominent example being the system of two entangled spin-half particles with each particle's spins (random outputs) being measured along one of two directions (inputs). It is traditional to say that such a system exhibits contextuality when it violates Bell-type inequalities. Derivations of Bell-type inequalities, however, are based on the assumption of no-signaling, more generally referred to as marginal selectivity: the distributions of outputs (spins) in Alice's particle do not depend on the inputs (directions chosen) for Bob's particle. In many applications this assumption is not satisfied, so that instead of contextuality one has to speak of direct cross-influences, e.g., of Bob's settings on Alice's spin distributions. While in quantum physics direct cross-influences can sometimes be prevented (e.g., by space-like separation of the two particles), in other applications, especially in behavioral and social systems, marginal selectivity almost never holds. It is unsatisfying that the highly meaningful notion of contextuality is made inapplicable by even slightest violations of marginal selectivity. Our new approach rectifies this: it allows one to define and measure contextuality on top of direct cross-influences, irrespective of whether marginal selectivity (no-signaling condition) holds. For systems with two binary inputs and two binary random outputs, contextuality means violation of the classical CHSH inequalities in which the upper bound 2 is replaced with 2(1 + ∆ 0 ), where ∆ 0 is a measure of deviation from marginal selectivity.
Introduction
In the foundations of quantum physics the notion of contextuality can be formulated in purely probabilistic terms within the framework of the Kolmogorovian probability theory [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The notion applies to any system of random variables recorded under different (mutually incompatible) conditions. Contextuality means that these random variables cannot be "sewn together" into a single system of jointly distributed random variables if one assumes that all or some of them preserve their identity across different conditions. Within the Kolmogorovian framework the existence of this single joint distribution is equivalent to the presentability of all random variables involved as functions of one and the same ("hidden") random variable [10] [11] [12] .
In spite of its long history (dating from Specker's 1960 example with three boxes [13] ), contextuality does not have a standard definition [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , and is often confounded with such notions as nonlocality and lack of realism (the notions we will not get into in this paper). All authors who use this term in quantum theory, however, agree on the possibility of detecting contextuality in the spins of entangled particles by violations of Bell-type inequalities [11, [21] [22] [23] . Many other tests have been developed for systems of random variables in and outside quantum physics, notably in psychology [24] [25] [26] [27] . All of these tests are necessary (sometimes also sufficient) conditions for non-contextuality, because of which all of them presuppose or are directly making use of the condition known in psychology as marginal selectivity [28, 29] and in quantum physics as no-signaling [30] [31] [32] . In this paper we use the first term, as more general and purely probabilistic (see Section 7) . If marginal selectivity is violated, no "sewing together" of the kind mentioned above is possible.
The problem associated with this fact is that in some cases (including all cases known to us in psychology) violations of marginal selectivity can be readily attributed to the lack of selectivity in the dependence of random variables on various components of the conditions under which they are recorded. If a person is asked to judge brightness and size of a visually presented object, it is not difficult to construct a model in which the judgment of brightness is directly influenced by physical intensity and also directly influenced by object's physical size. In the EPR/Bohm paradigm, if the two measurements of spins in entangled particles are separated by a time-like interval, the spatial axis chosen by Bob (for one of the particles) can in principle initiate a process that will directly influence the spin recorded by Alice (for another particle). We will refer to the dependence of an output distribution on the "wrong" input as a direct cross-influence. The Bell-type inequalities (e.g., in the CHSH form [22] ) cannot be derived under direct cross-influences, and whether or not they are violated therefore becomes irrelevant.
It seems strange and intellectually unsatisfying, however, that we can detect contextuality when marginal selectivity holds precisely, but we cannot speak of contextuality at all when it is violated, however slightly. In this paper we propose (for systems with two binary inputs and two binary random variables as outputs) a new definition and new measure of contextuality that overcome this difficulty: even in the presence of direct cross-influences (say, from Bob's setting to Alice's measurements and vice versa) we can detect the presence and compute the degree of contextual influences "on top of" the direct cross-influences.
A generalization of the theory to arbitrary systems with deterministic inputs and random outputs appears to be straightforward, but we do not attempt to present it here (although we present, without detailed discussion, results on the Leggett-Garg-type systems at the end of the paper). We have made an effort to keep the presentation on a very nontechnical level. This level would be difficult to maintain in a more systematical or more general presentation.
The System (α, β, A, B)
Consider a system with two binary inputs, α, β, and two outputs that are binary random variables, A, B. Alice chooses the value of α to be either α 1 or α 2 , and she records the corresponding value of A as either +1 or −1. Bob chooses the value of β to be either β 1 or β 2 , and he records the value of B as either +1 or −1. Alice and Bob do this repeatedly in successive trials, so that each input choice and output recording by Alice is paired with an input choice and output recording by Bob. They send their paired choices of inputs and recordings of the outputs to Charlie, who creates four tables of joint distributions: for every i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}, the distribution is
. . . 
Selectivity of influences and marginal selectivity
Let us assume that Charlie, based on some theory, expects that the dependence of A, B on α, β is selective: Bob's choice of β value does not influence Alice's A and vice versa:
This means that A i1 and A i2 are one and the same random variable for every i ∈ {1, 2}, and so are B 1 j and B 2 j for every j ∈ {1, 2}. Charlie can therefore relabel A i j into A i and B i j into B j . But he can also approach this in a more cautious way. He can retain the double indexation and ask the following question: given the eight random variables in (2) of which we know the expectations
can we impose a joint distribution on these eight random variables [33] such that
If the answer is affirmative, then the situation is equivalent to the existence of a joint distribution of the single-indexed
However, and this is the reason we call Charlie's approach cautious, the answer does not have to be affirmative. One situation that precludes this is if the following equalities are violated at least for one i or one j:
These equalities represent marginal selectivity of A with respect to changes in β and of B with respect to changes in α. This marginal selectivity is an obvious consequence of (6). If, e.g., A 11 were different from A 12 , then, as Bob changes the value of β from β 1 to β 2 , Alice's distribution of A for one and the same choice of α = α 1 changes. A 11 and A 12 cannot therefore be always equal, contravening (6) . In situations like this Charlie is forced then to revise his model (4) in favor of
This can be referred to as a model with direct cross-influences: the distribution (hence also identity) of the outputs is allows to be influenced by "wrong" inputs ("wrong" from the point of view of the Charlie's original theory [34] ).
Contextuality under marginal selectivity
There is also another possibility for Charlie's question to have a negative answer. The marginal selectivity requirement may very well be satisfied, but the observed expectations (5) may be incompatible with the hypothesis (6). The incompatibility means that a joint distribution of the eight random variables (2) that accords with both (5) and (6) does not exist. This understanding of contextuality was first utilized by Larsson [1] . It helps to understand the essence of all Bell-type theorems. Stated in the form convenient for our purposes, the theorem that applies to all systems with two binary inputs and two binary random outputs [11] says:
Theorem 4.1 (Fine, 1982) . The observed expectations (5) are compatible with the identity connections (6) if and only if marginal selectivity (8) is satisfied for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, and
The term "connections" used in this formulation [4] [5] [6] [7] refers to the unobservable pairs
Their unobservable joint distributions are given by
. . .
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. If (6) holds, i.e., the entries on the minor diagonals of the tables are zero, then the connections are called the identity ones. The compatibility of connections with the observed expectations (uniquely defining the observed distributions) means that each of the 2 8 possible combinations
is assigned a probability, so that the probabilities for all combinations containing, say, A 12 = 1 and B 12 = −1 sum to the observed Pr [A 12 = 1, B 12 = −1]; and the probabilities for all combinations containing, say, B 12 = 1 and B 22 = 1 equals the hypothetical (unobservable) connection probability Pr [B 12 = 1,
The inequalities (10) , in physics referred to as CHSH inequalities, can be violated, and they are de facto violated if A and B are spins of two entangled particles under certain choices of spatial axes (α and β) along which they are measured [35] [36] [37] . When these inequalities are violated while marginal selectivity is satisfied, we speak of contextuality: Alice's output A under her choice of α 1 does not change its distribution depending on Bob's choice of β 1 or β 2 , but A 11 and A 12 still cannot be considered one and the same random variable (it should not come as a surprise that different random variables can have the same distribution).
In the diagram below the interrupted lines indicate contextual influences: the dependence of identities of identically distributed random variables on the "wrong" inputs:
When the inequalities (10) are violated, a measure of contextuality can be easily designed as follows. If (6) were compatible with the observed expectations (5), then (by definition) Charlie could construct a joint distribution of the random variables (2) in which
equals zero. If (6) is incompatible with (5), then this ∆ cannot be zero in any joint distribution imposed on (2). It is natural therefore to adopt the following Definition 4.2. Under marginal selectivity, the degree of contextuality in a system with given observed expectations (5) is the minimal value of ∆ in (14) for which a joint distribution for (2) exists.
As it turns out, this minimal value of ∆ equals
where
is ( 1 /2 times) the violation of the CHSH inequalities. This is a special case of the formula derived later in Theorem 6.1 without the assumption of marginal selectivity.
As an example, let the observed expectations be at the Tsirelson bounds [38, 39] . Then ∆ min is √ 2 − 1. The largest possible value of ∆ min is 1.
Contextuality on top of direct cross-influences
The definition of contextuality given above does not work for the situation depicted in (9) , where marginal selectivity is not satisfied. In this case we have direct cross-influences from "wrong" inputs, and this precludes the possibility that ∆ in (14) is zero. In fact, we have the simple Theorem 5.1. Given the observed expectations A i j , B i j i, j∈{1,2} , the minimum possible value for ∆ in (14) is
Proof. 
The largest possible value for Pr [A 11 = 1,
, which is the sum of the entries on the minor diagonal, is |Pr [
Under the marginal selectivity we have ∆ 0 = 0, and we speak of contextuality if the minimal value of ∆ that is compatible with the observed expectations (5) is greater than ∆ 0 = 0. In the general case ∆ 0 > 0, and we need a more general definition of contextuality. The idea is simple. If ∆ 0 > 0, we have direct cross-influences (9), and if ∆ = ∆ 0 is compatible with the observed expectations (5), then no contextuality is involved: direct cross-influences is all one needs to account for the system's behavior. If however ∆ = ∆ 0 is not compatible with the observed expectations (5), then we can speak of contextuality "on top of" the direct cross-influences. The natural measure of the degree of contextuality then is given by Definition 5.2. The degree of contextuality in a system with given observed expectations (5) is ∆ min − ∆ 0 , where ∆ min is the minimal value of ∆ in (14) for which a joint distribution for (2) exists.
General formula for contextuality
We now need to derive a formula for ∆ min of which (15) is a special case.
Theorem 6.1. The minimum possible value ∆ min for ∆ that is compatible with the observed expectations (5) is
where ∆ 0 is given in (17) and ∆ CHSH in (16 
where s 1 (· · · ) is defined in (A.3) and is equal to the max |. . .|-part of (16). These inequalities are always mutually compatible, whence ∆ min is the larger of the two right-hand expressions in (20) and (21).
It follows that ∆ min − ∆ 0 is always nonnegative, and Definition 5.2 is well-constructed: ∆ min − ∆ 0 = 0 indicates no contextuality, ∆ min − ∆ 0 > 0 indicates contextuality on top of the direct cross-influences.
We can present the notion of (non-)contextuality in as close a form as possible to the traditional CHSH inequalities. The system exhibits no contextuality if and only if
where ∆ 0 is the natural measure of violation of marginal selectivity, (17) . If at least one of these inequalities is violated, then the largest difference between the left-hand side and 2 (1 + ∆ 0 ) is the degree of contextuality (after scaling by 1 /2).
The maximum value attainable by one of the linear combinations in (24) is 4. It follows that the system exhibits no contextuality if the violation of marginal selectivity ∆ 0 in it is not less than 1. Put differently, if ∆ 0 ≥ 1, any observed distributions of random variables can be accounted for in terms of direct crossinfluences, with no contextuality involved.
Consequences of the new definition of contextuality
The notion of contextuality was presented in Introduction to mean that random variables recorded under mutually incompatible conditions cannot be "sewn together" into a single system of jointly distributed random variables, provided one assumes that all or some of them preserve their identity across different conditions. We should now relax the assumption clause: contextuality means that random variables recorded under mutually incompatible conditions cannot be "sewn together" into a single system of jointly distributed random variables, provided one assumes that their identity across different conditions changes as little as possibly allowed by direct cross-influences (equivalently, by observed deviations from marginal selectivity).
As mentioned in Introduction, marginal selectivity is rarely satisfied outside quantum physics, and, in particular, is almost always violated in psychological experiments. Consider, e.g., a double-detection experiment, where a participant is presented two side-by-side flashes of light (left and right) and asked to say "Yes/No" to the question "Is there a flash on the left?" and another "Yes/No" to the question "Is there a flash on the right?". Each flash can be presented at two intensity levels: zero (no flash) and some very small value s > 0. We have therefore four conditions: (0, 0) , (0, s) , (s, 0) ,(s, s). Denoting the response about the left stimulus by A and he response about the right stimulus by B, we get the eight random variables A 00 , B 00 , . . . , A ss , B ss . The situation is formally identical to the Alice-Bob paradigm. The "normative" diagram (4), with α, β being the two flash intensities, is very likely to be violated on the level of marginal probabilities: the answer about the left flash will almost certainly be influenced by the intensity of the right flash, and vice versa. Our definition of contextuality, however, allows one to determine whether contextuality is there on top of these direct cross-influences.
Another example is taken from the work by Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo [40] . They estimated the probabilities with which people chose one of two presented to them animal names and one of two presented to them animal sounds. The results were as follows:
Probability estimates from Table 1 of Aerts et al. [40] . Here, α indicates one of the two animal dichotomies offered (α 1 = Horse or Bear, α 2 = Tiger or Cat), and β analogously indicates one of two animal sound dichotomies. The value of ∆ CHSH given by (16) equals 0.210 here, and Aerts et al. report it as evidence in favor of contextuality (note that the CHSH bound of 2 corresponds to ∆ CHSH = 0). We criticized this conclusion [41] by pointing out that the derivation of the CHSH inequalities is not valid without marginal selectivity, and the latter is clearly violated in the data: e.g., Pr [B 12 = Snorts] = 0.889 while Pr [B 22 = Snorts] = 0.247.
We can now amend our criticism: the computation of ∆ CHSH is meaningful even if marginal selectivity is contravened. One has, however, to compare ∆ CHSH to ∆ 0 of (17) rather than to zero, and to compute max {∆ 0 , ∆ CHSH } − ∆ 0 as the measure of contextuality. Unfortunately for the Aerts et al.'s conclusions, ∆ 0 in their data is too large (1.889) to allow for nonzero contextuality.
In quantum physics, the no-signaling condition (a special case of marginal selectivity) can be ensured by separating the outputs from the "wrong" inputs by space-like intervals. There are, however, some indications that in the well-known experiments by Weihs et al. [37] , where space-like separation is claimed to be the case, some violations of marginal selectivity were observed [42] . If so, and whatever the physical cause of these violations, our new approach provides a way of testing whether contextuality is still present in the data.
Signaling is natural to assume in Leggett-Garg-type systems [43] , with three binary random variables X,Y, Z tied to three successive moments of time, t 1 < t 2 < t 3 . Any two of these three random variables can be measured together, in one experiment, but not all three of them. If X and Z are measured together, then (in accordance with our general approach, see Refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ) the identity of X as a random variable may be different from the identity of X when measured together with Y . This means that X in the two situations should be labelled differently, say, X 13 and X 12 , respectively (based on the time moments involved). Analogously, we have Y 12 and Y 23 depending on whether Y is measured together with X or with Z; and we have Z 13 and Z 23 .
Suppes and Zanotti [10] have shown that given uniform marginals, an equivalent condition for the existence of a joint distribution of X 12 , X 13 ,Y 12 ,Y 23 , Z 13 , Z 23 (25) under the constraint
As a side product of our analysis, we show that this inequality in fact holds for arbitrary marginals as well and we generalize the inequalities to the signaling case.
Theorem 7.1. The minimum possible value ∆ ′ min for
that is compatible with the observed expectations
is the natural measure of the violation of marginal selectivity and
is ( 1 /2 times) the maximum violation of the Suppes-Zanotti inequalities (26) .
Proof. By Lemma XXX in appendix, ∆ ′ is compatible with the observed expectations (28) if and only if it satisfies
These inequalities are always mutually compatible, whence ∆ ′ min is the larger of the two right-hand expressions in (32) and (33). Definition 7.2. The degree of contextuality in a system with given observed expectations (28) is ∆ ′ min − ∆ ′ 0 , where ∆ ′ min is the minimal value of ∆ ′ in (27) for which a joint distribution for (25) exists. Signaling is natural to assume in Leggett-Garg-type systems [43] , with three binary random variables X,Y, Z tied to three successive moments of time, t 1 < t 2 < t 3 . Any two of these three random variables can be measured together, in one experiment, but not all three of them. The analysis here is slightly more complicated conceptually than for the EPR/Bohm paradigm. We present its results without getting into detail.
If X and Z are measured together, then (in accordance with our general approach, see Refs. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] ) the identity of X as a random variable may be different from the identity of X when measured together with Y . This means that X in the two situations should be labelled differently, say, X 13 and X 12 , respectively (based on the time moments involved). Analogously, we have Y 12 and Y 23 depending on whether Y is measured together with X or with Z; and we have Z 13 and Z 23 . While the identity of a random variable is a conceptual designation rather than a physical property, a direct influence on one measurement by another is a physical process. So it cannot act backwards in time, and we must have X 12 = X 13 . But it is possible that Y 12 = Y 23 and Z 13 = Z 23 , and we denote
Using essentially the same reasoning as for the EPR/Bohm paradigm (because of which we omit the formal proof), we come to the following
Theorem 7.3. A Leggett-Garg-type systems exhibits no contextuality if and only if
The largest in absolute value breach of one of these boundaries then can be taken as a measure of contextuality.
Inequalities (37) can also be equivalently rewritten closre to the Suppes-Zanotti formulation [10] : from the system (by solving the variable from the equation and then substituting the solution everywhere else). After that, we eliminate the three remaining connection expectation variables one by one using the Fourier-Motzkin elimination algorithm (see Theorem A.6 below). After the elimination of each variable, we remove any redundant inequalities from the system by linear programming using the algorithm described in Ref. [4, Text S3] . After having eliminated all connection expectation variables, we are left with the system (A.6) (and implicit constraints of the form (A.5) for the pairs (A i j , B i j ), i, j ∈ {1, 2}). The Fourier-Motzkin elimination algorithm guarantees that the resulting system has a solution precisely when the original system has a solution with some values of the eliminated variables.
Theorem A.6 (Fourier-Motzkin elimination). Given a system of linear inequalities in the variables x and y =y 1 , . . . , y n , the system can always be rearranged in the following form x ≥ l i ·y, i = 1, . . . , n l , x ≤ u i · y, i = 1, . . . , n u , 0 ≤ n i ·y, i = 1, . . . , n n , where l 1 , . . . , l n l , u 1 , . . . , u n u , n 1 , . . . , n n n ∈ R n . Furthermore, given y ∈ R, this system is solved by y and some x ∈ R if and only if the following system is solved by y: l i · y ≤ u j · y, i = 1, . . . , n l , j = 1, . . . , n u , 0 ≤ n i ·y, i = 1, . . . , n n . a, b, c, d , e, f ) = max {(±a ± b ± c ± d ± e ± f ) : the number of minuses is odd} . (A.8)
